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courts would probably follow the majority rule of the state courts; i.e.,
that one remarrying within the Wyoming statutory period of seven years,
believing, but not knowing, that the former spouse was in fact dead, would
do so at his peril so far as concerns the crime of bigamy.
STERLING

CASE

EVIDENCE COURT CONSIDERS ON MOTION
TO DIRECT VERDICT
Formerly many courts applied the scintilla doctrine as a basis for
determining the quantity of evidence required in order to defeat a motion
for a directed verdict.' Under that doctrine the motion was denied if the
party resisting it produced any evidence tending to support each material
allegation in his pleadings. 2 The scintilla doctrine has been replaced by
the substantial evidence rule which requires submission of a case to the
jury if there is sufficient evidence upon which reasonable men could reach
different conclusions. 3 The party opposing the motion must support each
4essential element in his pleadings with substantial evidence.
Although the substantial evidence rule has been adopted in most
states, there is a split of authority concerning how much evidence the
courts will examine in applying the rule.5 Here it should be mentioned
that this article is considering only the motion for a directed verdict made
after all the evidence has been introduced, and no consideration is given
to a motion for a directed verdict or an involuntary non-suit entered by the
defendant after the plaintiff has presented his case. In most jurisdictions
only the evidence in favor of the party resisting the motion will be considered. 6 If the defendant moves for a directed verdict, the court looks
at the plaintiff's evidence, and the motion is denied if the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case. 7 In applying the majority rule there are
One arises when the
two situations which present some difficulty.s
defenldant's evidence helps the plaintiff establish his cause of action. The
cases hold that any evidence in favor of the plaintiff will be considered
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Louisville & N.R. v. Chambers, 165 Ky. 703, 178 S.W. 1041 (1915).
Hamden Lodge No. 517, I.O.O.F. v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E.
246 (1934).
Nugent v. Nugent's Ex'r, 281 Ky. 263, 135 S.W.2d 877 (1940); Hamden Lodge No.
Contra,
517, I.O.O.F. v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E. 246 (1934).

Birmingham Electric Co. v. Freeman, 32 Ala. App. 479, 27 So.2d 231
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Leary v. Macheski, 92 Ohio App. 452, 110 N.E.2d 800 (1951).
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Note, 22 Tex. L. Rev. 359 (1944) ; McBaine, Trial Practice .
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(1946).

31 Cal. L. Rev. 454

(1943).
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Yance v. Hoskins, 225 Iowa 1108, 281 N.W. 489 (1938); Hamden Lodge No. 517,
I.O.O.F. v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E. 246 (1934); Klein v.
York, 149 Tenn. 81, 257 S.W. 861 (1924); Burghardt v. Detroit United Ry., 206

Mich. 540, 173 N.W. 360, 5 A.L.R. 1333 (1919); Karr v. Milwaukee Light, Heat &
Traction Co:, '132 Wis. 662, 113 N.W. 62
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Wilson v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 233 Mo.App. 1006, 128 S.W.2d 319 (1939). For
a discussion of prima facie case see: 9 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2494 (3d ed. 1940).
9 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2495 (3d ed. 1940).

NorI.s
including the evidence produced by the defendant9

Apparently the courts

feel that a prima facie case must go to the jury, and it is immaterial which
side establishes it. The other situation creates a more difficult problem
and occurs when the defendant establishes an affirmative defense by
uncontroverted evidence which destroys the plaintiff's prima facie case.
The problem arises because the majority rule is largely based on the
proposition that the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses are
matters strictly within the province of the jury, and, if the court considers
the defendant's evidence, it is thereby invading a field reserved for the
jury. 0 However, the cases hold that it is proper to examine not only the
plaintiff's evidence but also any uncontroverted evidence the defendant has
Courts should encounter
introduced to establish an affirmative defense."
no difficulty in deviating slightly from the majority rule to consider the
uncontroverted evidence of the defendant, because such evidence presents
no question of fact but rather concerns a matter of law in which no ques2
tion of the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence remains.'
Thus, in applying the majority rule unless one of the two situations just
considered is present, it is obvious that a ruling on defendant's motion after
plaintiff's evidence will always be the same as a ruling on the motion after
all the evidence.
Under the majority rule, if the plaintiff moves for a directed verdict,
only evidence presented by the defendant will be considered, and the
13
motion will be denied if the defense is supported by substantial evidence. '
Plaintiff's motion may present problems similar to those that may arise on
defendant's motion, and courts usually resolve these problems in the same
manner. If plaintiff's evidence favors the defendant, it will be examined
along with defendant's evidence.' 4 Also, if the uncontroverted evidence
produced by the plaintiff tends to destroy defendant's case, the court will
consider it on plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict."
The reasons given for applying the majority rule are primarily based
upon the right to trial by jury. The proponents of the rule maintain that
it would be an invasion of the right to jury trial to consider all the evidence
in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict.' 6
Once the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case or the defendant has supported his defense,
the case can not be destroyed by conflicting evidence but must be sub9.
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LaBonte v. Mutual Fire & Lightning Ins. Co., 75 Mont. 1, 241 Pac. 631 (1925).
Burke v. United Electric Rys. Co., 79 R.I. 50, 83 A.2d 88 (1951); Christensen v.
Utah Rapid Transit Co., 83 Utah 231, 27 P.2d 468 (1933).
Fuller v. DePaul University, 293 IIl.App. 261, 12 N.E.2d 213 (1938); Ritchie v. Long

Beach Community Hospital Ass'n, 139 Cal.App. 688, 34 P.2d 771 (1934).
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Note, 22 Cal. L. Rev. 230 (1934).
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Serv-Us Chain Stores, Inc. v. Arden Realty & Investment Co., 106 Colo. 369, 105 P.2d
850 (1940).
Bay Island Drainage & Levee District No. I v. Nussbaum, 388 Ii. 131, 56 N.E.2d
615 (1944).
Cincinnati v. Board of Education of School District of Cincinnati, 63 Ohio App.
549, 27 N.E.2d 413 (1940), appeal dismissed, 137 Ohio St. 568, 31 N.E.2d 440
(1941). See Tucson v. Apache Motors, 74 Ariz. 98, 245 P.2d 255 (1952).
Marable v. State ex rel. Wackernie, 32 Tenn.App. 238, 222 S.W.2d 234 (1949);
Tabor v. Continental Baking Co., 110 Ind.App. 633, 38 N.E.2d 257 (1941).
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initted to the jury. l7 Conflicting evidence presents issues of fact concerning
the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses which are jury
questions. is To further justify the majority rule a comparison is made between directing verdicts and setting aside verdicts on the grounds that the
verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. 19 In setting aside a verdict
the trial court considers all the evidence. 2 0 This is justified on the grounds
that the setting aside of a verdict is merely procedural, because the losing
party has the right to a new trial.2 1 However, the consequence of a directed
verdict is severe, becaues it is res judicata.2 2 Therefore, the court should
only consider the evidence of the party resisting a directed verdict to
determine whether he shall be barred from bringing another action without
the benefit of a verdict.
Contrary to the weight of authority, there are some jurisdictions which
23
consider all the evidence in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict.
These courts apply the substantial evidence test to all the evidence and
consequently must weigh the evidence and pass upon the credibility of
witnesses. 24 Here it should be pointed out that although all jurisdictions
use the substantial evidence test, they do not apply it in the same manner.
In the states following the majority view the test is whether the evidence
is substantial when looked at alone, while in the minority jurisdictions the
test is whether the evidence is substantial in light of all of the evidence.
The evidence of the movant will be examined even though it conflicts
with the evidence offered by the resisting party. The court will direct
a verdict if it feels that upon tie entire evidence reasonable men could

only find for the movant. 25 By this view a ruling on a motion for a
directed verdict after plaintiff's evidence could be different than a ruling
on a similar motion after all the evidence.
One argument for the minority rule is based upon a comparison with
setting aside verdicts. In setting aside a verdict the court looks at all the
evidence and decides as a matter of law that the verdict is unreasonable.
Following this reasoning tie court should be allowed to direct a verdict
for the same unreasonableness. 26 It is submitted that the minority rule
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Serv-us Chain Stores, Inc. v. Arden Realty & Investment Co., 106 Colo. 369, 105 P.2d
850 (1940); Wilson v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 233 Mo.App. 1006, 128 S.W.2d 319
(1939).
Burke v. United Electric Rys. Co., 79 R.I. 50, 83 A.2d 88 (1951); Christensen v.
Utah Rapid Transit Co., 83 Utah 231, 27 P.2d 468 (1933) ; Young v. Tennesse Electric Power Co., 22 Tenn.App. 308, 122 S.W.2d 821 (1938).
Note, 22 Col. L. Rev. 256 (1922).
DeRobbio v. Hart, 71 R.I. 347, 45 A.2d 169 (1946); Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound
Lines, 28 Cal.2d 357, 170 P.2d 465 (1946).
Notes, 22 Tex. L. Rev. 359 (1944); 22 Cal. L. Rev. 230 (1934).
Smith, Tbe Power of the judge To Direct a Verdict . . . 24 Col. L. Rev. 111, 116
(1924).
Hanson v. Homeland Ins. Co. of America, 232 Minn. 403. 45 N.W.2d 637 (1951)
Bank of United States v. Manheim, 264 N.Y. 45, 189 N.E. 776 (1934) ; Spaulding
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 94 Vt. 42, 109 Atl. 22 (1920).
McBaine, Trial Practice . . . 31 Cal. L. Rev. 454 (1943).
Audette v. Lindahl, 231 Minn. 239, 42 N.W.2d 717 (1950).
Smith, The Power of the Judge To Direct a Verdict . . . 24 Col. L. Rev. 111, 124
(1924).

NOTES

would put an end to litigation. By applying the majority rule a court
might not be able to direct a verdict, although it could later set the verdict
aside and grant a new trial. Under the minority rule a verdict can be
directed whenever it would be the duty of the court to set aside a verdict.
In considering the position Wyoming takes on directing verdicts, it
is well established that this state follows the majority rule. 27 If the evidence of the movant supplied a defect in his opponent's case, a Wyoming
court would probably consider this evidence, because in stating the majority
rule the Supreme Court of Wyoming has said that it will consider all the evidence in favor of the party resisting the motion.2 8 In one Wyoming case
the Court also mentioned that it would consider the uncontroverted evi29
dence of the movant.
Although Vyoming follows the weight of authority, the Supreme
Court applied the minority rule in the case of Smith v. Beard.30 This
was a malpractice suit in which physicians testified for both sides, and,
after all the evidence had been introduced, the court directed a verdict for
the defendant. The Supreme Court cited many malpractice cases from
other states in which the minority rule was used, but the court could only
cite one Wyoming case which mentioned the rule in a dictum.3'
There is very little case authority in Wyoming concerning what
evidence the court will consider on a motion to set aside a verdict.3 - In
two cases the trial court applied the same rule that was used in the Smith
case and considered all the evidence in determining whether to set a
verdict aside for insufficient evidence, but on appeal the Supreme Court
34
only looked at one side of the evidence. 33 Also in Branson v. Roelofsz
the Supreme Court only examined the evidence of the resisting party. In
that case the defendant appealed the overruling of his motions for a
directed verdict, new trial, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The Court considered the motions together without making any distinctions
among them and stated that only the evidence of the successful party
27.

28.
29.
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31.
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Chandler v. Dugan, 70 Wyo. 439, 251 P.2d 580 (1952); Meyer v. Culley, 69 Wyo.
285, 241 P.2d 87 (1952) ; Brown v. Wyoming Butane Gas Co., 66 Wyo. 67, 205 P.2d
116 (1949); Merback v. Blanchard, 56 Wyo. 152, 105 P.2d 272 (1940) ; Collins v.
Anderson, 37 Wyo. 275, 260 Pac. 1089 (1927).
Chandler v. Dugan, 70 Wyo. 439, 251 P.2d 580, 584 (1952); Meyer v. Culley, 69
Wyo. 285, 241 P.2d 87, 89 (1952); Merback v. Blanchard, 56 Wyo. 152. 105 P.2d
272, 274 (1940) ; Collins v. Anderson, 37 Wyo. 275, 260 Pac. 1089. 1090 (1927).
See Dudley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 64 Wyo. 357, 192 P.2d 617, 619 (1948).
56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260 (1941).
See In re Lane's Estate, 50 Wyo. 119, 58 P.2d 415 (1936), rehearing denied, 50
Wyo. 119, 60 P.2d 360, 363 (1936).
In Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 3 Wyo. 92, 237 Pac. 255, 262 (1925), the Supreme Court
stated that a motion to set aside a verdict was not authorized by the Wyoming
statutes; the correct procedure would be to move for a new trial on the grounds
that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence. This writer refers to a
motion to set aside a verdict merely to illustrate the effect of a successful motion
for a new trial.
Kowlak v. Tensleep Mercantile Co., 41 Wyo. 144, 281 Pac. 1000 (1929) ; Kester v.
Wagner, 22 Wyo. 512, 145 Pac. 748 (1915).
52 Wyo. 101, 70 P.2d 589 (1937).
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would be examined. 3 5 Thus, with few exceptions Wyoming applies the
majority view to all three motions.
In this field the real problem confronting the court is to determine
the bounds within which a jury should be allowed to act freely, and this
problem is brought out in the Smith case. There the Court pointed out
that in malpractice cases a great majority of the verdicts were rendered for
plaintiffs, and the opinion indicated that in actions of this type juries
were not qualified to reach verdicts on the conflicting facts. 36 The Court
mentioned that if a respectable minority of practicing physicians in the
community approved the methods used by the defendant, then as a matter
of law the case was not for the jury. 37 In order to direct a verdict all the
evidence had to be considered, so the Court upheld the direction of the
trial court by applying the minority rule. As indicated by the cases
decided after Smith v. Beard, Wyoming still follows the weight of authority.38 It is submitted that the majority rule is preferred, because judges
generally want to apply broad rules of procedures in order to keep from
examining all the facts of each case. However, it appears that in a proper
case the Wyoming Supreme Court would consider all the evidence to uphold
a directed verdict, if the Court felt that the case was correctly taken from
the jury.
The problem is in finding a means which will enable the court to
consider all the evidence. A court has always had the power to look at
all the evidence to determine where the great weight lay. As a closing
thought it is suggested that a motion for a new trial based on misconduct
of the jury in refusing to consider the weight of the evidence would enable
the court to consider all the evidence. The court would have to examine
the entire case in determining whether there had been misconduct by the
jury. Conceivably a court might seize upon misconduct of the jury if it
believed that the case should be withdrawn from the jury and that all the
evidence was needed in order to withdraw the case.
THOMAS
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